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The European Commission is in charge of applying the Treaty provisions of the European
Union (EU) and of implementing its policy measures together with national governments.
In addition to this executive function, it delivers recommendations for Community ini-
tiatives and drafts legislative proposals. It has own decision powers, e.g., in trade and
competition policy and represents the EU externally, e.g., in the WTO or enlargement
negotiations.
The selection and appointment of the Commission used to be a purely intergovern-
mental a®air, involving the Council of Ministers in the composition of national heads of
government or state. Decisions had to be unanimous, which created a balance of veto
powers that left individual members practically unrestricted. They could send to Brussels
whichever candidate was domestically opportune. The Treaties of Maastricht and Ams-
terdam then granted the European Parliament a formal say in the investiture procedure
in 1993 and 1999: it needs to approve ¯rst the nominated Commission President and then
again the full college of Commissioners before it can be appointed. In 2003, the Treaty of
Nice replaced the unanimity requirement by a quali¯ed majority rule, in principle allowing
enough Council members to prevent a nominee without derailing the whole investiture
process.
In view of these legal changes (see Section 2 for more details), one could expect the
composition of the current Barroso Commission to di®er in more than its size from, say, the
¯rst Delors Commission appointed 20 years earlier. A ¯rst puzzle is that the di®erence, if it
exists, is at least not obvious. The currently 27 Commissioners had an on average somewhat
higher pro¯le when they were appointed: while the Delors Commission was dominated by
senior civil servants and former party o±cials, the Barroso Commission comprises three
former prime ministers, ¯ve former foreign ministers, and four former ¯nance ministers;
only ¯ve present Commissioners have not been members of a national government at some
point. However, appointments such as that of Peter Mandelson { who was no longer tenable
at home but a trusted friend of Tony Blair's { hardly suggest a structural break from jolly
old times. That the share of former government members has increased might moreover be
interpreted as greater, not diminished Council in°uence despite the increased formal role
of the Parliament. Fittingly, only two current Commissioners have ever been members of
the European Parliament (in the fairly distant past and for less than a year in Olli Rehn's
case).
At the surface, the European Parliament has enjoyed two spectacular successes recently,
with a little help from the media: the original Italian and Latvian nominees for the Barroso
Commission, Rocco Buttiglione and Ingrida Udre, were replaced after severe criticisms.1 A
fundamental change of the way in which the Commission is selected would, however, likely
look di®erent and, for example, involve more candidates such as Viviane Reding who had
a close connection to the Parliament prior to joining the Commission. More pointedly, we
1L¶ aszl¶ o Kov¶ acs and Neelie Kroes were also criticized as unsuitable candidates, but were ¯nally
appointed (in Kov¶ acs' case involving a portfolio change).
1will argue in this paper that the European Parliament is still strategically powerless when
it comes to choosing the Commission.
This is not obvious from the seemingly balanced Treaty provisions. But it follows rather
straightforwardly from a game-theoretic analysis of the investiture procedure. The model
which is investigated in Section 3 adds standard { though admittedly very stringent {
assumptions (e.g., commonly known spatial preferences, the old Commission becomes a
lame duck at the end of its term, dimension-by-dimension decisions after the appointment)
to dynamic interaction that closely re°ects Art. 214 of the post-Nice version of the EC
Treaty. It turns out that heads of state or government can propose whom they like and,
crucially, these choices will be accepted in equilibrium. So we argue that the treaty reforms
formally gave the European Parliament teeth, but a big wooden block remains stuck in
between them.
This leads to a second puzzle: Anecdotal evidence as well as the few related empirical
studies (see KÄ onig et al. 2007 and Rasmusen 2003) suggest that Commission and Parlia-
ment get along very well { and, in fact, seemingly better than Commission and Council.
This was a common impression even before the mentioned legal changes, particularly re-
garding the issue of integration and pursuit of \an ever closer union among the peoples of
Europe" as set out in the preamble of the founding Treaty of Rome. How can the Council's
domination of the Commmission's appointment be reconciled with this?
When federal interests clash with national ones, Commissioner's loyalties might plau-
sibly be shifting after they have assumed o±ce; they may become `Europeanised'. An
inconclusive debate on whether this happens in practice or should happen in theory is
surveyed by Egeberg (1999) and recent doubts about this hypothesis have been raised,
e.g., by Hooghe (2005). We do not rule out any Thomas-Becket e®ects or perhaps delib-
erate `Brussels brainwashing' by seasoned bureaucrats as the cause of distance between
Commission and Council. But we propose an alternative, to us more simple and plau-
sible explanation: institutional rules. They { together with the con¯dentiality to which
the `principle of collective responsibility' obliges all Commission members { can create the
appearance of a preference change where there really is little or none.
To see this in a nutshell, suppose that the appointed Commissioners are perfectly
duplicating the respective Council members' preferences and that neither's preferences
change. The Commission then clones the Council at the individual level during its entire
term. Still the Commission in aggregate need not do so at any point in time. The key is that
both institutions use di®erent internal decision quotas: simple majority in the Commission
and a quali¯ed majority in the Council. This hands power to di®erent preference types
within Council and Commission. At least in the absence of cross-issue wheeling and dealing,
the Council's restrictive majority rule makes its collective ideal points on isolated questions
coincide with those of an issue-speci¯c conservative member. In contrast, the Commission's
position on non-consensual issues will be determined by its median, whose preferences
coincide with those of a moderate member of the Council under the duplication hypothesis.
Since Parliament also uses simple majority, its pivotal member tends to be a like-minded
political moderate.
Section 4 investigates this point in more detail and Section 5 provides new empirical
2evidence on institutional relations between Commission, Council, and Parliament. Our
analysis of data gathered by expert interviews on 162 decisions made under the Consulta-
tion and Codecision procedures between 1999 and 2002 con¯rms for this period that the
Commission is on average closer to the Parliament than to the Council. This validates a
key prediction of our formal analysis even though it does not test the model as such. In
particular, alternative explanations are also consistent with the data and will be brie°y
discussed in the concluding Section 6.
2 Related Literature and Legal Background
Legislative processes of the EU have received considerable analytical attention during the
last decade. The literature typically takes preferences of the respective stake-holders to be
either exogenous and independent of each other or it does not explicitly assume preferences
at all. Contributions of the former kind include Tsebelis (1994), Tsebelis and Garrett
(1997), Steunenberg and Selck (2002), and Franchino (2005); instances of the latter are
Laruelle and Widgr¶ en (1998), Baldwin et al. (2001), and Felsenthal and Machover (2004),
amongst others. In either type of analysis, the dependency between the Commission's
policy ideals and those of Council or Parliament which is the topic of this paper is ignored
(see the corresponding criticism by Hug 2003).
Hix (1997) and Crombez (1997) are notable exceptions, and most closely relate to our
analysis. Hix investigates the investiture of the Commission President. He argues that
because MEP candidates are primarily determined by national parties, whose views are
represented by national governments, the Parliament's approval can almost be taken for
granted after the Council has internally agreed on a candidate. Consequently, he ¯nds
\little practical di®erence between the original Commission President selection process,
where the EP did not have a say, and the procedure established by the Maastricht and
Amsterdam Treaties" (Hix 1997, p. 5). Crombez looks at the full Commission's investiture
and its post-appointment interaction with Council and Parliament. He criticizes the con-
ventional wisdom that the Commission is an independent pro-integrationist actor in the
EU. Though he takes more liberty with the (then pre-Amsterdam) Treaty rules2 and does
not predict any speci¯c preference con¯guration for the Commission, the ¯rst part of our
paper is quite similar to his analysis. In particular, Crombez models appointment of the
Commission as a strategic game. He then looks at those preferences that the Commission
might conceivably translate into actual policy, and argues that the investigated version
of the appointment procedure considerably limited the Commission's freedom to promote
an independent agenda. The post-Nice version imposes fewer constraints but keeps the
fundamental dependency (see Crombez and Hix 2004, and Hix et al. 2004). Crombez'
view contrasts with that expressed by Tsebelis and Garrett (2000). The latter argue that
2For example, Crombez assumes that the whole investiture procedure ends in failure after a
candidate proposed for the position of the Commission President has been rejected. Or, sup-
posedly, the designated President can nominate other Commission members after rejecting the
respective Council member's proposal. Also see Hug (1997).
3already before Nice the appointment process involved internal ¯lters su±cient to have a
well-balanced, high-pro¯le and therefore independent new Commission ready when the
preceding one's 5-year term expires. Wonka (2007) has recently provided evidence that on
the one hand con¯rms Tsebelis and Garrett's view: a big and increasing share of Com-
missioners appointed between 1958 and the present can be classi¯ed as `politically visible'
before their appointment. On the other hand, and with the same time trend, Commission-
ers' party background matters: it overwhelmingly re°ects that of the appointing national
government.
The Commission currently comprises 27 members { one from each EU member state. It
unilaterally decides on many day-to-day issues, e.g., in competition and trade policy along
the so-called administrative route, and makes any ¯rst proposal in the EU's various leg-
islative processes (the legislative route). The Commission has some discretion in selecting
between the administrative and legislative routes, but in any case both confer signi¯cant
power to it.3
Commissioners have individual portfolios and thus in practice exert asymmetric in-
°uence on EU policy. Formally, however, they act as a team or college chaired by its
President. If there is no consensus on delegating a given issue to a Commissioner or sta®
member,4 the college is supposed to act by a simple majority of its members (Art. 219, EC
Treaty). This and also the European Parliament's right to remove a Commission through
a motion of censure have been unchanged since the Treaty of Rome in 1957 (then referring
to the Assembly instead of the European Parliament).
Otherwise, rules regarding the appointment, composition and work of the Commission
have been modi¯ed many times { and will likely do so again when a replacement for the
failed Constitutional Treaty is agreed. Before 1993, the Council of Ministers (CM) selected
the next Commission by unanimous agreement or accord commun. Then, the Treaty of
Maastricht (Title II, 43.) gave the European Parliament (EP) the right to be consulted on
the governments' nominee for Commission President, and required an explicit approving
vote by EP on the complete college of Commissioners (as a single closed list).
The Treaty of Amsterdam, coming into force in 1999, replaced EP's consultation on the
President's investiture by a separate formal vote and gave the nominated President a veto
on the remaining Commissioners. Then the Treaty of Nice in 2003 removed the unanimity
requirement for CM: the Commission President and later the full college only need to be
endorsed by a quali¯ed majority. Moreover, the Treaty of Nice changed the composition
3For general discussions of the Commission's role in the EU see Pollack (1997) and Matl¶ ary
(1997). One anonymous referee opined that the Commission is less of a key player in 2007 than
it was twenty years ago. We concur with him and can add that the Commission's present size
has made the selection of an individual member less important than it used to be, too. Our
impression was that member states and Parliament were nevertheless very concerned with who
got appointed to the Barroso Commission.
4Particularly in ordinary press coverage, the term `Commission' is used not only for the college
of Commissioners but also their about 25,000 sta® in the Brussels head o±ces, the Luxembourg
o±ces and elsewhere (for comparison: the city of Helsinki employs about 39,000 civil servants).
We concentrate on the former and disregard decisions that are consensually delegated.
4of the Commission to one Commissioner from each member state { hitherto, large member
countries could have two Commissioners. And in response to the crisis of the Santer
Commission between 1998 and 1999 (see Topan 2002), individual Commissioners can now
be asked to resign by their President. In 2004, the Accession Treaty (or Act Concerning
the Conditions of Accession) gave Commission seats to the 10 new EU members, which
were joined in 2007 by Commissioners from Bulgaria and Romania. It is not clear if the
corresponding provisions will ever come into force, but the to-be-replaced Constitutional
Treaty calls for one proper seat for each EU member in a ¯rst new Commission and
thereafter voting Commissioners from only two thirds of the member states with non-
voting Commission members from the others on the basis of equal rotation (Art. I-26).5
In the following, we focus on current rules for appointment as speci¯ed by Art. 214®
of the EC Treaty, last amended by the Treaty of Nice and the Accession Treaties. The
provisions leave open a number of details. Where possible, we base our interpretation
of the Treaty provisions on what could publicly be observed during recent Commission
appointments as well as semi-o±cial sources.
The appointment process can be divided into ¯ve stages and summarized as follows:
1. CM, meeting in the composition of heads of government or state, nominates a person
it intends to appoint as Commission President by quali¯ed majority.
2. EP either approves the nominated candidate (by absolute majority of votes cast {
see Art. 198) or rejects him or her, leading back to stage 1.
3. CM members submit national candidates for the remaining Commission positions,
with the exception of the one already providing the nominated President. The des-
ignated President composes a list with one Commissioner from every member state
from the proposals. This list is either approved by CM by a quali¯ed majority, or
stage 3 is repeated.
4. EP either approves the entire nominated Commission by absolute majority or rejects
the entire college, leading back to stage 3.6
5. CM formally appoints the new Commission by quali¯ed majority.
If during the ¯ve years of their appointment, individual Commissioners resign, die, or
are retired, then CM decides on a replacement by quali¯ed majority without explicit role for
EP or the Commission President (Art. 215). The Commission President can ask individual
members of the Commission to resign. The Code of Conduct for Commissioners (2004)
5The European Convention's draft constitution did not have extra provisions for the ¯rst
post-rati¯cation Commission. In contrast, it was more speci¯c on the selection process for Com-
missioners (e.g., each country was to submit a list of three candidates including both genders).
6The Treaty is not explicit on what happens if EP has formally rejected the proposed college of
Commissioners: is the Council bound by its earlier EP-approved choice of Commission President
or may it restart the entire procedure? We assume the former.
5obliges them to comply with such a request. In cases of serious misconduct, the Council can
apply to the European Court of Justice to compulsorily retire individual Commissioners
(Art. 216). Moreover, EP can force the entire college of Commissioners to resign by a
two-thirds majority of votes (cast by at least half of all MEPs; Art. 201).7
3 Model and Ex Post Analysis
This section constructs a game-theoretic model of the described appointment procedure.
As any model, it is a simpli¯ed description that purposely leaves out many details {
including practically relevant ones such as the bounded rationality of actors or incomplete
information about their goals. We focus on the e®ects of two institutional rules, namely the
Council's monopoly over proposals and the respective internal majority requirements. Both
imply signi¯cant biases for the Commission's composition and its later inter-institutional
relations. Of course, the highlighted tendencies will in reality be moderated { but unlikely
canceled { by others related to, e.g., the long time horizon of interaction, power sharing in
national coalition governments, competence di®erences, populism directed to the national
electorate, etc.
We will ¯rst analyze the procedure ex post, i.e., for arbitrary but given spatial pref-
erences of the involved agents. Its implications from an ex ante or a priori standpoint
which tries to identify general institutional biases by averaging over all possible ideal point
pro¯les will be investigated in Section 4.
3.1 Stylized appointment game
The sequential nature of moves during the appointment process (and also the Commis-
sion's business thereafter) suggests a non-cooperative appointment game in extensive form
which involves Council members, MEPs, and { interim { the designated new Commission
President. In the game's description and analysis, one faces a trade-o® between formal
rigor and the immense complexity that results from the scope for an unbounded number
of iterations of and within the described stages 1 and 3. We con¯ne ourselves to a styl-
ized game which, e.g., treats the multilateral negotiations on which country provides the
Commission President as a black box. Its sequence of moves is illustrated in Figure 1.
Formal analysis requires a number of assumptions about players' preferences and their
respective sets of feasible actions. All of them impose restrictions but, ¯rst, in our view
represent a reasonable compromise with analytical tractability and, second, help to isolate
the biases induced by institutional rules:
(POL) Potential candidates di®er regarding their policy preferences, not their competence.
7The Council can by unanimous agreement alter the number of members of the Commission
(Art. 213). It is not speci¯ed whether this could, in theory, be used to e®ect a reduction of the
current Commission and lead to the dismissal of Commissioners.
6CM: Council of Ministers (qualified majority)
EP: European Parliament (simple majority)
Mj:  Head of government from member state j
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xj: candidate from member state j
Xj: candidate list from member state j
X2,…,X27 {x2,…,x27}
Figure 1: Stylized appointment game tree
(SPA) All players have spatial preferences, characterized by an individual ideal point ¸ in
the convex policy space X ½ Rk and the utility function




They have a stationary time preference characterized by a common discount factor
± 2 (0;1).8 Preferences are common knowledge.
(ABU) Suitable candidates for a Commission job are abundant for any position ¸ 2 X.
(DIM) The legislative status quo q 2 X can only be changed dimension-by-dimension (or
issue-by-issue). All k issues arrive randomly on the post-appointment agenda with
equal probability, which w.l.o.g. is taken to be 1.
(IND) With an interim probability p > 0 that is independent of the appointed Commission
and constant across issues, post-appointment legislative decisions either implement
the Commission's ideal policy xC
i or are (locally) insensitive to it.
(MED) The Commission's policy position is decided by a simple majority of its members
(Art. 219) and corresponds to the position of the median Commissioner in the re-
spective dimension.
8Player-speci¯c discount factors would not change the equilibrium.
7(LAM) The old Commission becomes a `lame duck' when the appointment process starts;
keeping it forever is the worst outcome for su±ciently many members of CM and EP.
The main (albeit standard) limitation follows from assumptions (DIM) and (MED): they
break down a complex, multi-dimensional and potentially indeterminate decision-making
problem into a sequence of one-dimensional ones with straightforward solutions. If one
assumed a strong consensus orientation in the Commission, a weighted average position
should replace the median. Extra weight on the latter would still be called for by the
`shadow' which will likely be cast by the anticipated disagreement outcome on any consen-
sus agreement { giving rise to qualitatively similar results below. Alternatively, one might
assume that Commissioners have a lot of discretion in their respective portfolios. This
would reduce the number k of issues to which our model applies, and add some baseline
distance to the numbers calculated in Section 4.
The critical part of (IND) is not so much the dichotomy of outcomes, i.e., implemen-
tation of either the Commission's ideal policy or an outcome fully determined by other
players { this naturally arises on the administrative route and is consistent with game-
theoretic predictions for both the Consultation and the Codecision procedures.9 Rather
the frequency of either case should in theory depend on the appointed Commission. Ac-
counting for the link would be complicated by uncertainty at the time of the investiture,
e.g., regarding the future composition of CM, but forward-looking members of CM or EP
should strictly speaking treat p as an endogenous variable.
The qualitative ¯ndings below will be robust to the extent that a more sophisticated
treatment of post-appointment decision making or other variations of the assumptions do
not a®ect the following lemma (see the Appendix for a proof):
Lemma 1 All MEPs and members of CM seek to install a Commission whose dimension-
by-dimension median position is as close to their respective own position as possible.
This result, obtained under the listed idealizing assumptions, ignores many practical issues
such as candidates' competence or incomplete information about them. The latter in
reality makes the choice of a candidate risky. One could capture this in the model by
replacing actual with expected policy positions (presuming risk neutrality), which would
allow for unpleasant surprises in later institutional relations but leave member state's
privilege to propose candidates una®ected. The introduction of candidates with di®erent
competence (weakening the assumptions (POL) and (SPA)) would create a trade o® with
proximity. It would result in less extreme equilibrium predictions below but not change the
identi¯ed structural power imbalance. Similarly, giving up (ABU) would induce agents to
9The subgame perfect equilibrium for the Consultation procedure results in either xC
i , the
policy closest to xC
i which makes the pivotal Council member indi®erent to the status quo, some
policy that the Council unanimously agrees without Commission in°uence, or simply the status
quo. In contrast, xC
i plays no role under the Codecision procedure { its predicted outcome is
determined primarily by CM (cf. Napel and Widgr¶ en 2006; also see Napel and Widgr¶ en 2004 on
outcome sensitivity and decision power more generally).
8seek the best available substitute for the respective ideal candidate, without fundamental
di®erences.
3.2 Analysis of the appointment game
Delay at stage 5 brings no advantage to Council members. In particular, the stationarity
of preferences formalized by (SPA) implies that any interest in delaying the decision by
one period must persist in the subsequent period, i.e., would necessarily translate into a
preference for perpetual delay. (LAM) rules this out. So every member of CM has at least
a weak preference for appointing the nominees. Anticipating that a quali¯ed majority
of other CM members will vote for the appointment (or a blocking minority against), an
individual Council member actually is indi®erent. However, we will throughout the analysis
break such ties in favor of the candidate(s). So CM appoints the nominated Commission
unanimously.
At stage 4, each MEP will vote for CM's proposal if this gives no less utility than
continuation of the game at stage 3. In particular, after a rejection by EP the nominated
Commission President and CM make another proposal which could be the same as the
rejected one (possibly involving new faces, but with the same preferences). This means
that a coalition comprising the nominated President and (a quali¯ed majority of) CM
plays a monopolistic-o®er bargaining game with EP or, more precisely, the MEP singled
out to receive the median utility from the o®er.10
This bargaining game { essentially an open-ended version of the so-called ultimatum
game { in abstract terms involves two players, 1 and 2, who interact as follows:
1. Player 1 o®ers a share y 2 [0;1] of a possible joint surplus to player 2.
2. Player 2 accepts or rejects y.
3. If player 2 accepts, payo®s are (1¡y;y). Otherwise, the game moves back to 1. with
next stage's payo®s discounted by factor ± 2 (0;1).
It is a subgame perfect equilibrium for player 1 to propose y = 0 after any history of play
and for player 2 to accept any o®er y ¸ 0. Using arguments similar to Rubinstein (1982),
one can show that immediate agreement on y = 0 is, in fact, the unique subgame perfect
equilibrium outcome (see, e.g., Muthoo 1999, sec. 7.2.2).
This equilibrium prediction may seem somewhat extreme { one can expect that EP
in practice manages to extract at least some appointment rent, e.g., by threatening a
10The appointment of judges to the US Supreme Court involves a similar monopoly over propos-
als held by the US President. The outside option of the Senate, who must con¯rm any nominee,
is, however, better than that of EP: only individual deceased or retired judges are replaced and
the Court always stays fully operational. There is thus no analogue of (LAM). The exclusive right
to propose still results in new judges who broadly re°ect the US President's preferences { with
red lines last tested by the nomination of Harriet Miers. See, e.g., Segal et al. (1995) and Martin
and Quinn (2002) and the references therein for investigations of justices' ideological positions.
9damaging media campaign if the proposal is too CM-biased.11 Keeping things simple,
we will nevertheless use it. It then follows that EP will accept any Commission that is
better than a perpetual lame duck at stage 4, i.e., the nominated President and (a quali¯ed
majority of) CM get whatever candidates they agree on in the previous stage.
During stage 3 the respective heads of government or state propose national candi-
dates to their fellow Council members and the nominated President. This amounts to 26
monopolistic-o®er bargaining games with heads of government or state as proposers. The
responders { the respective 26 other heads and the nominated President { can only delay
an agreement but not make any counter-proposals.12 Moreover, it is generally incredible
for the nominated President to threaten to ask undesired Commission members to resign
later: ¯rst, even though Art. 215 is not explicit on this, it seems that the respective head
of government or state would again be the one to propose a new candidate. Second, a
quali¯ed majority of CM has to agree on the replacement before a resigned Commissioner
actually leaves the college; however, without great coincidence or coordinated collusion,
there is a blocking simple majority against replacements a®ecting the median positions
of the Commission. So, in e®ect, heads of government or state face no constraints in
selecting `their' national Commissioner due to (LAM), i.e., the Maastricht reform of the
Commission's investiture mainly constituted a cosmetic change.13
In what we will refer to as the truth-telling equilibrium every country j will nominate
a Commission member with ideal point °j = ¹j, i.e., a person duplicating the respective
head of government or state's position ¹j. This is not the only equilibrium of the subgame
starting in stage 3, but clearly the focal one since all other equilibria are either outcome-
equivalent (heads of government or state misrepresent their ideal point in dimensions in
which they are not decisive in the college anyway) or involve collusion between some
Council members against others. Such collusion equilibria arise as follows: a dimension-i
misrepresentation of country j's ideal point by ¢xi has an e®ect if that member j is the
unique median on issue i. In this case, j is actually hurt by its own misrepresentation {
but 13 others are bene¯tting from it. For high enough dimensionality of the policy space
it is then possible to build a `cartel' of, say, 25 members who each misrepresent their issue-
speci¯c ideal points in such a way that the two `outsiders' are always amongst the 14 losers.
This implies that `insiders' win more often than they lose and, in summary, bene¯t from
the deal. Whilst such options may be good to exist in principle (think of national elections
producing a rogue head of government who can thus be kept in check), their exercise is
surely in violation with the EU's `principle of equality'. Moreover, it requires coordination
11Recall that the prediction also rests on the assumption of complete information. Temporary
impasses such as during the Barroso Commission's nomination demonstrate that CM in reality
has asymmetric information about MEPs' reservation utility.
12Credible threats to reject a bad o®er and then to respond with a counter-o®er, i.e., to turn
the table, drive the more symmetric outcome in Rubinstein's (1982) bargaining game.
13Note that EP's passage of a motion of censure simply restarts the CM-dominated appointment
procedure. So this oldest instrument of parliamentary power has always been blunt; it cannot
bring about di®erent policies unless CM wants them (possibly after having a new composition).
10and potential punishment of free-riders. Truth-telling, in contrast, constitutes an equitable
equilibrium in simple, frugal, and transparent strategies.
Analogous reasoning applies to stages 2 and 1. By (MED) there is no special bene¯t
from providing the Commission President, at least in our stylized game. CM can hence
select an arbitrary country j to nominate the President, e.g., one for which a particu-
larly high-pro¯le candidate attractive to the respective national government is available.
Anticipating truth-telling equilibrium strategies of the other Council members, country
j's representative will optimally propose a candidate with °j = ¹j, who is then endorsed
by CM and approved by EP. In summary, we predict that in equilibrium °k = ¹k for
k = 1;:::;27, i.e., every Commissioner replicates the respective national Council mem-
ber's own preferences.
It is not hard to think of real-world `counter-examples'. For instance, the former social
democratic Finnish ¯nance minister Erkki Liikanen was selected to be Finland's ¯rst Com-
missioner in 1994 by a center-right coalition, joining a left-wing German trade union repre-
sentative, Monika Wulf-Matthies, appointed by right-wing chancellor Kohl. More recently,
former German chancellor SchrÄ oder suggested a Commission job for his key opponent of
the 2002 national elections (and at the time possibly again in 2006). Other examples could
be added.14 They may have led Tsebelis and Garrett (2000) to hold that Commissioners'
appointments are primarily merit-based, with national governments generally seeking to
send important and independent personalities to Brussels. That would actually not con-
tradict the prediction of overwhelming Council in°uence on the Commission's selection:
heads of state or government in equilibrium only care (i.e., are not indi®erent but have a
strict preference) about their nominee in those dimensions in which their own position is
the Council's median one. These amount to a priori 1=27 ¼ 3:7% of all relevant dimensions
in case of 27 Council members; the remaining 96.3% others provide enormous °exibility. In
particular, they can be used in order to pursue unmodeled additional goals: e.g., to foster
a national consensus, to please coalition partners, to reward political friends, to cater to
particular constituencies, etc. Choosing a virtual duplicate of oneself is the focal strategy
in our model, but more re¯ned preference assumptions would break the big number of
equilibrium ties in other and more realistic ways.
4 A priori Implications for Institutional Relations
Above analysis implies that heads of government or state can propose and with EP's help
approve the Commissioners they like best: `clones' of themselves. This ¯nding leads to
more questions. If the Commission is a clone of the Council, why would the EU need
it? Perhaps it is a federalist ¯g leaf, covering a primarily intergovernmental and economic
project never meant to result in genuine political integration. Or may the Commission's
role be simply to serve as a high-powered secretariat to the Council? Legislation according
14See MacMullen (1997) for a comprehensive account of Commissioners' characteristics, dating
back to Jean Monnet. He notes \reallocation of domestic political patronage" as the prime reason
if single-term Commissioners were denied renomination.
11to, e.g., the Consultation procedure could then amount to the writing down and rubber-
stamping of Council policy, in spite of the EC Treaty provision that \The Members of the
Commission shall, in the general interest of the Community, be completely independent in
the performance of their duties." (Art. 213(2)).
Related questions about the power and independence of an appointed bureaucrat or
a set of dependant agents have a long history in political science. In the context of the
European Commission, it goes back at least to Coombes (1970) who highlighted functions
of the Commission such as taking own initiatives, laying down rules, and interpreting the
common European interest on a day-to-day basis which point to actual independence.
So do the explicit empowerment to independently impose anti-dumping measures and
¯nes, to prohibit mergers and acquisitions, to disallow subsidies by member governments,
etc. Generally, the administrative route is under exclusive control of the Commission and
gives it considerable leeway. Consequently, a sizeable literature analyzes the Commission's
activity in the principal-agent framework (see, e.g., Pollack 1997, Franchino 2000, 2004,
or Thomson 2008; Kassim and Menon 2002 give a critical survey). Stressing the role of
informational advantages, moral hazard, and agenda setting, it provides ample reasons for
not expecting the Commission to act like a clone of the Council in practice.15
We will add to these a more basic, either under-appreciated or overlooked explanation
for why the Commission will pursue di®erent goals than the Council: in our view, a
major reason are institutional rules. In particular, there exist di®erent internal rules for
reaching decisions and thereby for aggregating preferences in both institutions. Even if
Commissioners individually duplicate CM members, the Commission in aggregate need
not and typically will not.
The simple majority rule which is applied by the Commission whenever there is no con-
sensus makes its median in any given dimension the focal prediction for the corresponding
aggregate policy position. Based on the previous section's analysis, the Commission's ideal
policy can therefore be expected to be determined by the issue-speci¯c Council median.
However, the latter will very rarely coincide with the aggregate position of CM because
that results from a rather complex quali¯ed majority rule: supporters of a Council motion
regarding carbon emission levels, the speed of electricity deregulation, or the fat contents
of chocolate etc. have to constitute a majority in three ways. In particular, there have to
be at least 255 votes out of 345 (¼ 74%) in favor of a proposal.16
It is worthwhile to illustrate the e®ect of the respective majority rule on policy relations
by a few `back of the envelope' computations. They are not meant to give a realistic picture
of current or recent institutional relations (see Section 5), but to show the a priori bias
15Another practical reason for why the Commission should not be expected to rubber-stamp
the Council's decisions is that the latter typically does not meet in the composition of heads of
government or state, but rather of specialist ministers with possibly incongruent interests. See
Henning (2004) on systematic di®erences between the position of national ministers of agriculture
and their superiors.
16We refer to the Treaty of Nice for details. `Yes'-votes currently also have to represent 62%
of total EU population and a simple majority of member states.
12towards cooperation between Commission and EP (rather than CM) which is built into
institutional rules. The same tendencies would obtain also for other assumptions, e.g.,
about the distribution of individual ideal points and are therefore likely to be relevant in
practice, too.
Consider an unweighted 74% rule (20 out of 27 equal votes) as a ¯rst approximation
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Namely, only positions xCM
i satisfying (1) would be supported by a quali¯ed Council
majority and could not be successfully replaced by another internal policy proposal.
Similarly, denoting the issue-speci¯c ordered ideal points of the currently 785 MEP by
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Any continuous a priori distribution of the ideal points of members of CM and EP implies
with (2) and (3) that the Commission's and EP's a priori propensity for change is
Pr(°
(14)
i 6= qi) = Pr(¼
(393)
i 6= qi) = 1:
The corresponding number for CM depends on the actual ideal point distribution, but the
more demanding majority rule in CM robustly makes its propensity for change smaller
than that of EP and Commission. If, as a typical a priori benchmark, one assumes that










= 1 ¡ (20=28 ¡ 8=28) ¼ 0:571
for CM's propensity for change. A similar di®erence would prevail also for other assump-
tions: institutional rules a priori make the Commission and the Parliament the European
Union's most dynamic players and the Council its most conservative institution. EP and
Commission are more likely to agree on a need for change than CM and Commission are.
When CM and Commission do agree on change, their preference dependence in theory
lets them automatically agree on the direction. This is not the case for EP and Commission.
However, the former almost always want to go quite di®erent distances, in contrast to
13often similarly central ideal points of EP and Commission. Average distances are therefore
smaller between Commission and EP than between Commission and CM under various
distributional assumptions.
For a numerical illustration, again let individual ideal points and the status quo be


















as the average distance between EP and Commission. Moreover, avoiding a more complex
while still ad hoc model of intra-Council bargaining, assume that the Council's actual policy
position, xCM
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i.e., CM and Commission are on average noticeably farther apart than Commission and
EP.18
CM would have smaller distance to the Commission if, e.g., the entire Parliament acted
as a single unitary actor with uniformly distributed ideal point. In this sense, greater
closeness between Commission and EP is sensitive to distributional assumptions. Still, one
can robustly conclude a priori that CM and Commission rarely hold particularly similar
positions.
In our view, this is the key to why the EU has a role for Commissioners who share the
appointing national Council members' preferences on decisive issues: Loosely speaking the
same players sit in CM and Commission. But internal rules allocate decision power to a
di®erent pivot in each institution. Its simple majority rule lets the Commission represent an
issue-speci¯c moderate member state. In contrast, CM speaks for a conservative one. One
could say that the Commission protects member states against excessive Council inertia,
while the Council provides a safeguard against the dynamism of simple majority rule in
EP and Commission.
5 Evidence on Institutional Relations
Above statements regarding the distinct degrees of conservatism of Council, Parliament,
and Commission and average distances between their policy positions are derived entirely
a priori. We made preference assumptions that were unrelated to any empirical observa-
tions and interpreted Treaty provisions in a very legalistic way (e.g., regarding the use of
simple majority rule by the Commission). It is therefore useful to check related empirical
evidence. Unfortunately, reliable quantitative information on stake-holders' preferences in
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14standing Commissioners, who are obliged to the `principle of collective responsibility' and
strict con¯dentiality, makes a direct test of the model in Section 3 almost impossible.
Two recent empirical studies, however, lend at least some support to our game-theoretic
prediction that heads of state or government remain unrestricted in picking `their' Com-
missioners. Using the same post-Amsterdam data set which will we will investigate below,
Thomson (2008) studies the distance between the Commission's aggregate policy position
and the policy position of the home member state of the Commissioner primarily responsi-
ble for drafting the respective legislative proposal. For issues on which the Council decides
by quali¯ed majority voting, the Commission's positions happen to be signi¯cantly closer
to the positions of the responsible Commissioners' home member states than to other policy
positions. This suggests that Council members indeed manage to appoint Commissioners
who are aligned with their own interests. They also manage to appoint candidates who
share the respective national government's party a±liation(s), as found by Wonka (2007).
He has compared the personal political background of all Commissioners since 1958 with
the relevant attributes of the nominating governments.
We here concentrate on institutional relations and confront Section 4's prediction with
data. Greater similarity between Commission and Parliament can, of course, result for
many reasons other than internal decision rules. For instance, a new Commission and a
new Parliament might go through the same supranational socialization after they assume
o±ce and get `Europeanised'. Hooghe's (2005) case study questions that this plays a
major role, but other hypotheses can be put forward and will be discussed below. The
following should therefore be viewed not as a targeted test of our theoretical investigation
but rather as a robustness check: if the data does not show the predicted institutional
(dis)similarities, the identi¯ed institutional biases would be too weak to matter (or are
compensated by neglected ones).
KÄ onig, Lindberg, Lechner, and Pohlmeier (2007) analyze data on 69 proposals involving
73 issues that reached the conciliation stage of the Codecision procedure between May 1999
and July 2002.19 According to the experts interviewed for their study, the Commission
supported EP on 41 issues whilst it supported CM on only 24 issues. This relative closeness
of Commission and EP is con¯rmed by anecdotal evidence. In her analysis of the Codecision
procedure, Rasmusen (2003, sec. 5.2) quotes, for instance, an interviewed MEP as saying
\::: the Commission expects that the Parliament will help it to get more [than the original
proposal] ::: " and a Commissioner as noting \Often we can use the parliamentarians to
pass certain messages, because they have a right to say what they like ::: there is a very
good co-operation."
In the following, we add to KÄ onig et al.'s quantitative evidence and analyze a data set
19Above back-of-the-envelope computations refer to EU27, whilst Thomson's (2008), KÄ onig
et al.'s (2007) and our data still relate to EU15. The crucial di®erence between the respective
simple and quali¯ed majority requirements has been una®ected by enlargements. So ballpark
¯gures similar to those of Section 4 obtain for EU15, and we expect similar empirical results
when more recent data becomes available. Note also that Amsterdam's switch from unanimity
to quali¯ed majority did not a®ect the focal equilibrium of Section 3's appointment game.
15covering 66 multi-issue legislative proposals that were made before or in 2000 and concluded
between May 1999 and February 2002. The data was collected by an international group
of researchers.20 Reports in Agence Europe, the main independent daily news service on
EU a®airs, were used to select issues of general political importance and with at least a
minimum level of controversy. Then, interviews with altogether 125 experts were carried
out. Most of these were a±liated with the permanent representations of the member states
in Brussels. These experts were usually desk o±cers responsible for representing their state
in Council negotiations. Others were a±liated with the Commission, European Parliament,
Council Secretariat and interest groups. These experts provided estimates on actors' policy
positions on a [¡100;100]-scale, the status quo point, issue salience, and actual outcome on
a total of 162 controversial issues. The corresponding dossiers cover a wide range of policy
domains: the internal market, agriculture, ¯sheries, ECOFIN, justice and home a®airs,
general, culture, development, employment, energy, industry, social a®airs and transport.
We only use information about players' preferences { not policy outcomes.
We deduced the Council's aggregate position from the estimated policy positions of its
15 members plus the pre-Nice weight assignment and decision quota. 15 issues had to be
removed because too many preference values were missing. Of the remaining 147 issues, 83
had been decided using the Consultation procedure and 64 using the Codecision procedure.
When we tested for di®erences in the degree of conservatism, accurate information on the
status quo was needed. This lead to the exclusion of another 34 issues, with 56 of the
remaining issues pertaining to Codecision and 57 to Consultation.21
The ideal points attributed to the three institutions fail to be approximately normally
distributed, so that we could not perform a paired t-test. We recurred to non-parametric
statistical methods, in particular the Wilcoxon signed-ranks test (see Wilcoxon 1945 or,
e.g., Siegel and Castellan 1988 for a textbook presentation). This test disregards the level
of, say, the Commission's conservatism as picked up by its distance to the status quo,
jxC
i ¡ qij, and similarly the Council's conservatism but assumes that there is information
in the sign and magnitude of the di®erence between these two status quo distances for any
given issue i.22
We ¯rst considered the following three null hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1 Conservatism of CM (i.e., the inverse of distance between issue-speci¯c
20For details see Thomson, Stokman, Achen, and KÄ onig (2006) and the special issue of European
Union Politics 5(1), 2004.
21When testing Hypothesis 4 below, CM's pivot for these 34 issues was deduced using the
modal status quo in the data, q = 0. { Note that we obtain distinct distance observations from
di®erent issues of any given dossier. If instead we ignore obvious comparability problems and look
at aggregate dossier-wise distances, CM is the most conservative institution and also has greater
distance to the Commission than EP. Latter ¯nding is, however, not signi¯cant for aggregate
distances.
22The related Fisher sign test only exploits the sign. The corresponding p-values turn out to
be only slightly larger for our data.
16status quo and ideal point of CM) is not greater than that of EP,23 i.e.,
H0: jx
CM
i ¡ qij ¸ jx
EP
i ¡ qij:
Hypothesis 2 Conservatism of CM is not greater than that of the Commission, i.e.,
H0: jx
CM
i ¡ qij ¸ jx
C
i ¡ qij:
Hypothesis 3 Conservatism of EP is not greater than that of the Commission, i.e.,
H0: jx
EP
i ¡ qij ¸ jx
C
i ¡ qij:
The ¯rst three diagrams in Figure 2 illustrate the empirical cumulative distribution
functions of the respective two distance variables.24 Table 1 provides some descriptive
statistics and the test results. The Wilcoxon test statistic Zw asymptotically has a standard
normal distribution, i.e., we can for instance reject the ¯rst null hypothesis with 97:5%-
con¯dence if Zw < ¡1:96, and then conclude that, in fact, jxCM
i ¡qij < jxEP
i ¡qij. It turns
out that
1. CM is signi¯cantly more conservative than EP,
2. CM is signi¯cantly more conservative than the Commission, and
3. Commission and EP do not exhibit any signi¯cant di®erence in their conservatism.25
These results are very much in accord with the predictions. A high number of ties
between EP and the pivotal Council member is, however, worth noting. It indicates that
our a priori assumption of independent ideal points with a continuous distribution is a
major idealization.
We ¯nally tested the following null hypothesis:
Hypothesis 4 Closeness between CM and the Commission (i.e., the inverse of distance











As indicated in Table 1, this hypothesis can be rejected, and we conclude
23The comparisons refer to ¯rst degree stochastic dominance, i.e., more formally we as-
sume comparability based on Figure 2 and test H0: FjXCM¡Qj(y) · FjXEP¡Qj(y) for all y vs.
H1: FjXCM¡Qj(y) ¸ FjXEP¡Qj(y) with strict inequality for at least some y.
24Theoretically, the [¡100;100]-scale would have allowed for distances ranging from 0 to 200.
For most issues the status quo point was in fact q = 0 and all actors' ideal points lay in the
interval [0;100]. For the remaining issues, distances between Council pivot, EP, and Commission
turned out to range only between 0 and 100, too.
25This is con¯rmed by testing H0
0: jxEP
i ¡ qij · jxC
i ¡ qij.
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Figure 2: C.d.f. of EP's, CM's and Commission's distance to status quo and of EP's and CM's
distance to Commission
18Hypothesis 1 n = 113
Parliament is more conservative than Council 4
Council is more conservative than Parliament 56
Ties 53
Zw ¡6:219¤¤¤
Asymptotic p-value (one-tailed) .000
Hypothesis 2 n = 113
Commission is more conservative than Council 24
Council is more conservative than Commission 73
Ties 16
Zw ¡4:412¤¤¤
Asymptotic p-value (one-tailed) .000
Hypothesis 3 n = 113
Commission is more conservative than Parliament 46
Parliament is more conservative than Commission 49
Ties 18
Zw 0.704
Asymptotic p-value (one-tailed) .241
Hypothesis 4 n = 147
Commission is closer to Council 37
Commission is closer to Parliament 61
Ties 49
Zw ¡2:774¤¤
Asymptotic p-value (one-tailed) .003
Table 1: Tests of Hypotheses 1{4 (¤¤/¤¤¤: signi¯cant at 99%/99.9%)
194. EP and the Commission are signi¯cantly closer than CM and the Commission.
As mentioned, the data set contains issues from both main EU decision procedures.
They di®er in particular regarding EP's role: the Parliament has neither veto power nor
any binding say under the Consultation procedure, while it has both under the Codecision
procedure speci¯ed in Art. 251.26 The Consultation procedure pertains particularly to
common agricultural policy, but also competition, taxation and approximation of laws.
Restricting attention to it, Hypotheses 1, 2 and 4 were rejected at the same levels of
signi¯cance as before, while Hypothesis 3 could again not be rejected.
The Codecision procedure is most widely used for regulations and directives concerning
the internal market, but also transport, public health, education and research, the envi-
ronment, and the Regional Development Fund. Restricting attention to it we could reject
Hypothesis 1 at the old 99.9%-level of signi¯cance and Hypothesis 2 at 90% (Zw = ¡1:557¤,
asympt. p = 0:060). In contrast to the pooled data, Hypothesis 4 cannot be rejected for
Codecision alone (Zw = ¡1:247, asympt. p = 0:106). However, Hypothesis 3 can be re-
jected for only Codecision issues at the 90%-level (Zw = ¡1:407¤, asympt. p = 0:080),
i.e., EP is signi¯cantly more conservative than the Commission in the corresponding pol-
icy dimensions. This may in particular re°ect EP's reluctance to liberalize the internal
market.
6 Concluding Remarks
There exist several plausible reasons other than voting rules for the ¯nding that the Com-
mission's policy positions are closer to those of the Parliament than of the Council. We
already pointed to the Thomas-Beckett e®ect, named after the close friend of English king
Henry II who was appointed by Henry as archbishop of Canterbury and then sided with
the church in Rome, actually becoming Henry's key opponent (see, e.g., Hillman 2003,
sec. 3.3.4). Commissioners might similarly take up their job with national government-
aligned preferences and, say, scepticism towards an ever closer union but then they become
`Europeanised' and converge to a federalist `Brussels consensus' shared with a majority of
MEPs. The signi¯cance of this is, however, questioned not only by Hooghe (2005) but also
Thomson (2008).
Principal-agent models as investigated by Pollack (1997) or Franchino (2000, 2004)
explain the Commission's independence of Council interests by its informational advan-
tages and agenda-setting (see also Kassim and Menon 2002). They and explicit decision
powers of the Commission allow for a great degree of self-motivated political entrepreneur-
ship. For example, newly appointed Commissioners might demonstratively abandon the
policy positions of their former patrons as a means to prove their independence and gain
leverage inside the EU bureaucracy, akin to new central bankers seeking to assert their anti-
in°ationary stance. Such derivatives of asymmetric information and agenda power could
26Even under the Codecision procedure EP is signi¯cantly less powerful than CM (see Napel
and Widgr¶ en 2006).
20explain a signi¯cant distance between CM and the Commission, but not why the Com-
mission and EP are close to each other both in relative and absolute terms. Institutional
rules can explain both. The classical agency problems related to asymmetric information,
moral hazard, incomplete contracts, or transaction costs can be expected to abound in the
European Commission at large, but concerning the college of Commissioners and, yet more
speci¯cally, the relationship of its policy positions to those of CM and EP as institutional
actors, decision rules seem at least as relevant.
Another prospective explanation for divergent interests is given by Dowding (2000):
Commission and EP respectively conserve the political map of Europe for ¯ve years at
about the same point of time.27 Uncoordinated elections of national governments, in
contrast, result in an ever-changing CM. This could explain a growing distance between
Council and Commission. A complementing view is that the Commission can develop
better relations and trust with EP given that both are at least partially Brussels-based
and share about 4.5 years of their respective service (see, e.g., Topan 2002). More extensive
data that, e.g., allow a distinction between periods of small and great Council turnover
hopefully make it possible to test these alternative explanations in the future.
Whether intentionally or not, the last Treaty reforms have given the European Par-
liament a formally important role which, however, from a strategic point of view is only
symbolic. The bringing about of a new face for, e.g., the Italian Commission seat may be
regarded as a breakthrough and sign of increased parliamentary power. But Buttiglione's
replacement, Franco Frattini from Silvio Berlusconi's Forza Italia, would probably not
count as the Parliament's ¯rst or second choice. Its victory could only be of a partial
nature because national governments have kept their monopoly over proposing candidates.
Under our idealizing assumptions (blending out information problems, concern for con-
sensus inside the Council, or governments' interest in not discrediting a new Commission
by making very unpopular choices) we have deduced that national heads of state or govern-
ment face few restrictions and can pick national Commissioners who share their respective
political preferences regardless of the policy ideals of the European Parliament. That this
does not imply a close alliance between Council and Commission in their later interaction
with the Parliament can be explained very straightforwardly by di®erent institutional rules
for aggregating preferences. A changing Council composition and agency problems may
also matter but one can expect preferences of the Council and the Commission to diverge
even in an ideal world without these.
Since institutional rules are determined by the Council, one is tempted to ask why they
are as they are. In particular, why does the Council not align the Commission's decision
27Parliamentary elections and the Commission's appointment have been
pretty much synchronized since 1994. The Treaty is not explicit here but
http://europa.eu/institutions/inst/comm/index en.htm (consulted in September 2007) holds
that \A new Commission is appointed every ¯ve years, within six months of the elections to the
European Parliament" { implicitly ruling out prolonged periods of impasse in the appointment
process. If a Commission is replaced as the result of a motion of censure, the new Commission's
term expires at the date originally set for the resigned one (Art. 201).
21rule with its own? The use of simple majority rule in the Commission might be sacrosanct
because it was already part of the Treaty of Rome. It is more likely, though, that several
Council members have no interest in amending it (and a unanimous decision would be
required). The reason is that the Council as a unitary actor would prefer dealing with
a Commission that shares its own preferences, but individual Council members may be
very happy to see the Commission represent and pursue their minority (or unquali¯ed
majority) interests whenever the more conservative members prevail inside the Council.
Even if a member state is not sure whether it will more often hold a moderate than
a conservative position, risk aversion and a taste for hedging one's bets make distinct
majority requirements appealing. They can be viewed as an ex ante compromise between
ex post conservative and ex post progressive interests in the Council. In this interpretation,
the Commission is neither a ¯g leaf nor just an executive secretariat, but an essential part
of an institutionalized balance of power between the members states.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1:
Given (potential) Commissioners with ideal points °1;:::;°27 denote their dimension-i
median ideal point by °
(m)
i . (SPA), (DIM), (IND) and (MED) then imply that the expected
utility to a player with ideal point ¸ from appointing a Commission ¡ = (°1;:::;°27) is




p ¢ j¸i ¡ °
(m)
i j + ¹ Ui(¸)
´
where ¹ Ui(¸) is a constant una®ected by the selected Commission. Since p is assumed to







i j = u(°
(m);¸):
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